Author Archives: ole.koksvik@gmail.com

October 6, 2017: Fifth meeting at Aarhus University.

On October 6 2017, NorMind will be holding its fifth meeting at Aarhus University

Speakers:

  • Melanie Rosen (Aarhus)
  • Jesper Kallestrup (Edinburgh)
  • Madeleine Hyde (Stockholm)
  • Thor Grünbaum (Copenhagen)

The meeting is a general philosophy of mind and cognitive science workshop, open to researchers working both within and outside the Nordic region, though a central aim is to foster networking activities within the region.

Everyone is welcome, not least early career students and scholars!

Registration is not necessary, but please send an email to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (filasp@cas.au.dk) by September 22 if you want to join us for lunch (sponsored) and/or dinner (at your own expense).

Continue reading

Share

Call for Abstracts: Workshop on the Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology, Bergen, June 6-7, 2017

Call for Abstracts, Workshop on the Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology

University of Bergen, June 6–7, 2017.

>> The organisers especially encourage participation from members of under-represented groups. Travel and accommodation funding will very likely be available. Please scroll down for further information <<

Description

Previous orthodoxy in philosophy of mind held that there is something it is like to perceive — perceptual experiences have a phenomenal character — but there is no phenomenology associated with thought. Over the past few decades, this orthodoxy has been powerfully challenged: a number of authors have argued that there is a phenomenology of thought, or cognitive phenomenology (‘CP’).

Much research has focused on whether CP is reducible. Few deny that thoughts are associated with phenomenal experience, but many think that this fact can be explained by occurrent, remembered, or imagined perceptual experiences which are associated with the thoughts, rather than by attributing a phenomenal character to thought itself.

In this workshop we bracket the reducibility question, and focus instead on what the rational role of CP is. We understand CP broadly: in addition to the phenomenology of thought contents and attitudes, metacognitive feelings such as certainty or doubt, relevance or irrelevance, a thought being supported, or not, by a previous one, agency or passivity for thoughts, and so on, all count as instances. Given that thought has phenomenal character, what can this tell us about our nature as rational agents? We take serious engagement with this question to often require careful description of the nature of CP’s relevant aspects, so we particularly encourage engagements with the topic that have a substantive descriptive component.

Confirmed speakers:

Call for Abstracts

Four talk slots (45 + 45 minutes) will be filled through the CfA process. Abstracts should be 1000 — 1500 words long, prepared for blind review (taking care to remove all personal information), and emailed in a word or pdf attachment to post[a]fof.uib.no no later than 1 February 2017, with ‘Submission to Cognitive Phenomenology Workshop’ in the subject line. In preparing your abstract, please pay close attention to the workshop description and the below list of questions.

Where two submissions are otherwise deemed roughly equal in terms of quality and fit, submissions from members of under-represented groups will be preferred. If you feel comfortable doing so, please include relevant information about yourself in the email (though not in the abstract prepared for blind review).

You will be notified of our decision in writing no later than 1 March 2017. Travel will be organised shortly thereafter.

We cannot at this stage guarantee that we will be able to cover costs for speakers accepted through this process, but it is overwhelmingly likely that we will be able to do so.

Relevant questions for the workshop include:

  • What are the role descriptions for ‘work’ that needs doing by a rational agent, and which CP is a good candidate to perform?
  • How (if at all) does CP help us keep track of relevance / irrelevance in a chain of thought? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • What role (if any) does CP play in determining which thoughts form part of a coherent line of thought, and which are external to that line? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • How (if at all) does CP help us keep track of confidence-assessments of our judgements? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • How (if at all) does CP help us keep track of relations between our present thoughts and our background attitudes? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • In what ways (if any) does CP contribute to reasoning and deliberation? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • What role (if any) does CP play in self-knowledge of thoughts and attitudes? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • What significance (if any) do experiences of activity/passivity about thoughts have for rationality? What contributions can the study of pathological phenomena like thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations make to an understanding of that significance?
  • Is there a phenomenology of relevance? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • What (if any) impact does verbal phenomenology related to our thoughts have on the structure of our thought-processes? How does this support our rationality, and how might this support break down?
  • Is it possible to bring the rationality-supporting aspects of cognitive phenomenology into a taxonomy? Can those aspects be analyzed in terms of a limited number of basic types of experience?

Inclusiveness

Members of groups that are under-represented in philosophy are especially encouraged to submit. This includes, but is not limited to, women, persons of colour, LGBTQI persons, and persons with a disability. Where two submissions are otherwise deemed roughly equal in terms of quality and fit, submissions from members of under-represented groups will be preferred.

The workshop will be held in a wheelchair accessible venue, with an accessible toilet in the immediate vicinity, as will the workshop dinner.

We will assist in organising accessible accommodation as required.

We will support speakers in organising child care, and, if funding permits, also to pay for it.

Talks will be conducted in accordance with the UK’s Society for Women in Philosophy’s ‘Seminar Chairing Policy Suggestions’.

Further information

The workshop will be followed by a one-day workshop on auditory verbal hallucinations on June 8th that we co-organize with neuroscientists from the University of Bergen (Department of Biological and Medical Psychology, Kenneth Hugdahl and collaborators).

The speakers from both events will be invited to a boat trip to the fjords around Bergen on June 9th.

After the workshop, the organisers will consider seeking a publication outlet for the presented papers, either in an edited collection or in a journal special issue.

Share

Third Meeting: CSMN, Oslo, January 14

Normind is holding its third workshop on January 14th at CSMN at the University of Oslo, and it would be great to see some (maybe many!) of you there. We welcome especially early career students and scholars! We hope that these meetings can generate a friendly, low-pressure, and inclusive platform for the exchange of ideas.
http://www.hf.uio.no/csmn/english/research/news-and-events/events/normind-3.html

Date: January 14th, 2016

The meeting is a general philosophy of mind and cognitive science workshop, open to both researchers working within and outside the Nordic region, though a central aim is to foster networking activities within the region.

Register by emailing Sebastian Watzl, sebaswat [at] csmn.uio.no with the subject line “Normind registration”. Please indicate if you intend to join us for dinner (at your own expense, cost: around 350 NOK).

Note for students (PhD or MA level):
Students are able to give very short presentations (~5 min) of their projects within the open session toward the end of the day, if this facilitates the release of funding for attendance. Please contact Sebastian if this applies to you.

Programme
10:30 – 10:45: Welcome
10:45 – 12:05: Åsa Wikforss (University of Stockholm)
12:05 – 12:50: Lunch
12:50 – 14:10: Donnchadh O’Conaill (University of Helsinki)
14:10 – 14:25: Break
14:25 – 15:45: Anna Drożdżowicz (University of Oslo)
15:45 – 16:00: Break
16:00 – 17:20: Pär Sundström (Umeå University)
17:20 – 18:00: Open session
18:15 – 19:15: Drinks
19:30: Dinner

Venue:
Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (University of Oslo)
Room 652
Georg Morgenstiernes Hus
Blindernveien 31
Maps:
https://goo.gl/TvpdvT (walk from Subway (T-Bane) stop ”Blindern”, Lines 4 + 6);
https://goo.gl/BgXwpe (walk from Tram (trikk) stop ”Universitetet Blindern”,  Lines 17+18)

More Philosophy:
Please note that surrounding the Normind Workshop there are also some other philosophy events here at CSMN that some of you may be interested in: e.g. The Thought and Sense Kickoff Workshop  and a Progress in Philosophy Workshop. You are, of course, welcome to attend those as well.

 

Sebastian, CSMN, University of Oslo

http://folk.uio.no/sebaswat/

Share

CfP: CitSotMaB2016: CAUSALITY IN THE SCIENCES OF THE MIND AND BRAIN

CitSotMaB2016: CAUSALITY IN THE SCIENCES OF THE MIND AND BRAIN

June 27-29th 2016, Aarhus University, Denmark

This conference in the Causality in the Sciences (CitS) series will focus on causality in the sciences of the mind and brain. Included in these sciences are psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience. The questions that this conference will address include: What characterizes the notion of causation in the sciences of the mind and brain? Are different notions required for different sciences or experimental methods? Are there differences in the notions that are explicitly and implicitly assumed in the methods employed? What counts as causal evidence in these sciences? What role is played by information of interventions and physical mechanisms in identifying causal claims in the sciences of the mind and brain?

Continue reading

Share

New Members Page

Dear All,

At NorMind #2 in Copenhagen it was decided that we’ll keep a roster of members. I’ve now put up a Members page (with one two entries so far).

To be listed, just email me, with your name (with your family name in ALL CAPS), a short text, a picture, and the address of your homepage, if you’d like me to link to that, and I’ll put it up.

Email-updates once a day

Dear All,

For reasons unknown to me, the settings controlling how often emails are sent to those subscribed to email updates had changed from ‘daily’ to ‘for every post’. I have changed it back, meaning (I hope) that subscribers will now at most get one email a day (although in practice much more rarely).

I apologise for the spam to your inboxes.

–Ole

Share

Second Meeting: Copenhagen, September 4, 2015

After a successful first meeting in Bergen, the next NorMind meeting is set for September 4th at the Centre for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen.
The meeting is a general philosophy of mind and cognitive science workshop, open to both researchers working within and outside the Nordic region, though a central aim is to foster networking activities within the region.
Register by emailing Adrian Alsmith, asmith [at] hum.ku.dk with the subject line “Normind registration”. Please indicate if you intend to join us for dinner (at your own expense).
Note for students: 
Students are able to give very short presentations (~5 min) of their projects within the open session toward the end of the day, if this facilitates the release of funding for attendance. Please contact Adrian if this applies to you.
Programme
10:30 – 10:45: Welcome
10:45 – 12:05: Valterri Arstila: “The sense in which experiences are temporally extended”
12:05 – 12:50: Lunch
12:50 – 14:10: Ingar Brinck: “The core of social expertise” 
14:10 – 14:25: Break
14:25 – 15:45: Pauliina Remes: “Self-Knowledge in the Neoplatonist Plotinus” 
15:45 – 16:00: Break
16:00 – 17:20: Dan Zahavi: “Plural self-awareness and the we-perspective”
17:20 – 18:00: Open session
18:15 – 20:00: Drinks in Islands Brygge
20:30: Dinner in Islands Brygge
Venue
The workshop will be in the meeting room of the Centre for Subjectivity Research. Here it is on Google Maps:


https://goo.gl/maps/R5Mw1

It is on the 5th floor of building 25 of the Humanities campus in Amager, located at Njalsgade 140 – 142. The nearest Metro stop is Islands Brygge, here is a map from there:

https://goo.gl/maps/c3Pa2

Abstracts
Valterri Arstila: “The sense in which experiences are temporally extended”
It is commonly held that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion and succession. Philosophers have explained such experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time. In this talk, I argue that temporal experiences can be explained without relying on the doctrine. I will end on considering the ways in which our experiences can be thought to be temporally extended.
 
Ingar Brink: “The core of social expertise”
TBA
 
Pauliina Remes: “Self-Knowledge in the Neoplatonist Plotinus: Between Detectivism and Constitutivism”
The Neoplatonist Plotinus (ca. 204-270 AD) is the originator of the distinction between soul and a self, enabling investigation of self-knowledge with more precision and directness than was possible in antiquity before him. In the Enneads, Plotinus describes self-knowledge as an accomplishment, the quest for which begins with introspection and ultimately grows into a process of sculpting ourselves. Self-knowledge is thus understood as transforming the character and the life of the person engaging in it. The possibility for this, however, is grounded upon an innate capacity for introspection.
 
Dan Zahavi: “Plural self-awareness and the we-perspective”
In a number of recent publications, Hans Bernhard Schmid has defended a novel proposal concerning the nature of collective intentionality and argued that plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the case of the individual mind. Whereas I agree with Schmid that it is crucial to clarify the nature of the we-perspective and the ‘sense of us’, I will in my talk focus on some worries I have regarding the details of his proposal and regarding his defense of what might be called a token-identity account of experiential sharing.

 

Share